IT Security 4 weeks ago

CVE-2026-19569: Critical Integer Wrap‑Around Vulnerability in Zephyr RTOS – Impact, Exploits & Mitigation

CVE-2026-19569 is a critical integer wrap‑around bug in Zephyr RTOS’s dynamic object allocation that lets unprivileged user‑mode threads corrupt kernel memory and gain full kernel privileges. CVE-2026-19569 is a critical integer wrap‑around bug in Zephyr RTOS’s dynamic object allocation that lets unprivileged user‑mode threads corrupt kernel memory and gain full kernel privileges.

IT Security

CVE-2026-19569: Critical Integer Wrap-Around in Zephyr RTOS User-Mode Kernel Object Allocation

Executive Summary

CVE-2026-19569 is a critical integer wrap-around vulnerability affecting the Zephyr Real-Time Operating System (RTOS) kernel object allocation subsystem. The flaw exists in the dynamic_object_create() function within kernel/userspace/userspace.c, where size calculations for heap allocations lack unsigned integer overflow validation.

An unprivileged user-mode thread can exploit this vulnerability by supplying a size parameter near SIZE_MAX, triggering integer wrap-around and causing the kernel to allocate a truncated heap buffer while registering a full-sized object descriptor. Subsequent kernel initialization syscalls perform out-of-bounds (OOB) supervisor-mode writes, enabling heap metadata corruption, kernel object hijacking, and ultimately privilege escalation from user-mode to kernel-mode execution.

Impact: Complete breakdown of the CONFIG_USERSPACE security boundary, arbitrary kernel code execution, and total loss of system integrity, confidentiality, and availability.



What Is CVE-2026-19569?

Vulnerability Overview

CVE-2026-19569 is classified as Critical with a CVSS score reflecting high severity. The vulnerability enables local privilege escalation from unprivileged user-mode execution to kernel-mode code execution through memory corruption.

The root cause is straightforward: the Zephyr kernel’s dynamic object allocation pathway fails to validate size calculations for unsigned integer overflow before committing heap allocations. This allows an attacker to create a mismatch between the allocated heap buffer size and the registered kernel object descriptor size.

Root Cause: Integer Wrap-Around in Size Calculation

The vulnerable code path involves two primary size calculation expressions:

  1. Standard Kernel Objects: obj_size_get(otype) + size
  2. Thread Stack Elements: STACK_ELEMENT_DATA_SIZE(size) (macro-based calculation with rounding and overhead)

Neither expression includes overflow detection. When a user-mode thread calls k_object_alloc_size() with a size parameter close to SIZE_MAX, the arithmetic wraps around to a small positive integer. The kernel then:

  • Allocates a tiny heap chunk (a few bytes) from the thread’s resource pool
  • Registers a full-sized object descriptor in the kernel object table
  • Tags the descriptor with the requested object type (e.g., K_OBJ_MUTEX)

This creates a critical mismatch: the heap allocation is undersized, but the kernel treats the handle as a valid, full-sized object.

Why This Matters for Zephyr RTOS

Zephyr’s CONFIG_USERSPACE feature provides a security boundary separating unprivileged user-mode threads from privileged kernel-mode execution. This boundary relies on strict validation of all syscall parameters and kernel object state.

CVE-2026-19569 completely bypasses this validation:

  • Verification handlers (z_vrfy_k_object_alloc_size()) act as bare pass-throughs without bounds checking
  • Object initialization syscalls (k_mutex_init(), k_sem_init(), k_thread_create()) perform supervisor-mode writes without re-validating object size
  • Heap metadata becomes corrupted, allowing attackers to manipulate kernel data structures

For embedded systems, IoT devices, and safety-critical applications relying on Zephyr’s user-mode isolation, this vulnerability represents a complete security failure.



What Is Affected

Vulnerable Zephyr Versions

All Zephyr RTOS builds configured with the following settings are vulnerable:

  • CONFIG_USERSPACE=y (user-mode support enabled)
  • CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS=y OR CONFIG_DYNAMIC_THREAD=y (dynamic kernel object/thread creation enabled)
  • Executing thread has an assigned kernel resource pool

There is no specific version cutoff. The vulnerability exists in all releases where dynamic_object_create() lacks explicit unsigned wrap-around checks.

Required Kernel Configurations

The vulnerability requires a specific configuration combination:

Configuration Required Purpose
CONFIG_USERSPACE Yes Enables user-mode thread support and syscall validation
CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS Yes* Allows user-mode threads to allocate kernel objects dynamically
CONFIG_DYNAMIC_THREAD Yes* Allows user-mode threads to create new threads with dynamic stacks
CONFIG_GEN_PRIV_STACKS No Amplifies impact by allowing privileged stack base manipulation
Resource Pool Assignment Yes Thread must have an assigned kernel resource pool

*At least one of these must be enabled for exploitation.

Affected Components and Functions

The vulnerability spans multiple kernel subsystems:

Component File Vulnerable Function
User-Space Subsystem kernel/userspace/userspace.c dynamic_object_create()
Syscall Handler kernel/userspace/userspace_handler.c z_vrfy_k_object_alloc_size()
Dynamic Allocation kernel/dynamic.c k_thread_stack_alloc()
Kernel Object Header include/zephyr/sys/kobject.h k_object_alloc_size() syscall definition

Technical Attack Mechanism

Step 1: Triggering Integer Wrap-Around via Syscall

An unprivileged user-mode thread invokes the k_object_alloc_size() syscall with carefully crafted parameters:

// Attacker-controlled syscall invocation
k_object_alloc_size(K_OBJ_MUTEX, SIZE_MAX - 10);

The syscall handler z_vrfy_k_object_alloc_size() performs minimal validation:

  • Checks that otype is a valid object type
  • Does NOT validate the size parameter
  • Acts as a bare pass-through to z_object_alloc()

Step 2: Heap Truncation and Descriptor Mismatch

Inside dynamic_object_create(), the kernel calculates the backing heap size:

// Vulnerable code (simplified)
size_t backing_size = obj_size_get(otype) + size;
// If otype is K_OBJ_MUTEX (e.g., 64 bytes) and size is SIZE_MAX - 10:
// backing_size = 64 + (SIZE_MAX - 10) = SIZE_MAX + 54
// Integer wrap-around occurs: backing_size = 53 (or similar small value)
void *heap_ptr = sys_heap_alloc(&pool->heap, backing_size);
// Allocates only 53 bytes from sys_heap

Despite the tiny allocation, the kernel:

  • Registers the handle in the kernel object table
  • Tags it with the full object type (K_OBJ_MUTEX)
  • Returns the handle to the user-mode thread

Step 3: Out-of-Bounds Supervisor Writes

The user-mode thread then calls an initialization syscall:

k_mutex_init(handle);  // handle points to 53-byte heap chunk

The kernel’s k_mutex_init() implementation:

  1. Validates the handle using K_SYSCALL_OBJ_INIT(handle, K_OBJ_MUTEX)
  2. Validation passes because the descriptor is correctly tagged
  3. Writes the full k_mutex structure (typically 64+ bytes) into the 53-byte buffer
  4. Out-of-bounds write occurs in supervisor mode, corrupting adjacent heap metadata and kernel objects

Step 4: Sandbox Escape and Privilege Escalation

With corrupted heap metadata, the attacker can:

  1. Heap Metadata Hijacking: Corrupt sys_heap chunk headers to manipulate future allocations
  2. Kernel Object Overwrite: Overwrite adjacent kernel objects (semaphores, mutexes, thread descriptors)
  3. Control Flow Hijacking: Corrupt function pointers or return addresses in kernel data structures
  4. Privileged Stack Manipulation: (If CONFIG_GEN_PRIV_STACKS is enabled) Inject a wild pointer as the privileged stack base, allowing kernel-mode stack control
  5. Arbitrary Code Execution: Execute arbitrary code in kernel/supervisor mode

Memory layout showing heap truncation attack: undersized allocation (53 bytes) vs. full object write (64+ bytes), causing overflow into adjacent heap metadata.
Memory layout showing heap truncation attack: undersized allocation (53 bytes) vs. full object write (64+ bytes), causing overflow into adjacent heap metadata.

Real-World Attack Scenarios

Scenario 1: Heap Metadata Corruption and Kernel Escape

Attacker Goal: Escape the user-mode sandbox and execute arbitrary kernel code.

Attack Steps:

  1. Allocate Undersized Mutex:
   k_obj_handle_t handle = k_object_alloc_size(K_OBJ_MUTEX, SIZE_MAX - 10);
   // Kernel allocates 53 bytes, but descriptor is tagged as K_OBJ_MUTEX
  1. Trigger Out-of-Bounds Write:
   k_mutex_init(handle);
   // Kernel writes 64-byte k_mutex structure into 53-byte buffer
   // Overflow corrupts adjacent heap chunk header
  1. Exploit Corrupted Heap:
  • Attacker allocates another object, triggering heap consolidation
  • Corrupted chunk header causes sys_heap to misalign allocations
  • Attacker gains control over heap layout
  1. Overwrite Kernel Object:
  • Allocate a semaphore or thread descriptor at a predictable heap location
  • Use corrupted heap to write attacker-controlled data into the kernel object
  • Corrupt the object’s function pointer or state
  1. Achieve Code Execution:
  • Trigger a syscall that dereferences the corrupted function pointer
  • Execute arbitrary code in kernel mode

Impact: Complete privilege escalation; attacker can read/write arbitrary kernel memory, disable security features, or crash the system.

Scenario 2: Privileged Stack Hijacking via CONFIGGENPRIV_STACKS

Attacker Goal: Control kernel-mode stack execution to execute arbitrary code.

Prerequisites: Kernel compiled with CONFIG_GEN_PRIV_STACKS=y

Attack Steps:

  1. Allocate Undersized Stack:
   k_obj_handle_t stack_handle = k_thread_stack_alloc(SIZE_MAX - 100);
   // Kernel allocates 100 bytes, but descriptor is tagged as a full stack
  1. Inject Wild Pointer:
  • The undersized stack object stores an attacker-influenced pointer as the privileged stack base
  • This pointer can be set to attacker-controlled memory
  1. Trigger Kernel Mode Entry:
   // User-mode thread makes a syscall
   k_mutex_lock(some_mutex);
   // Kernel switches to privileged mode using corrupted stack base
  1. Control Kernel Stack:
  • Kernel uses the attacker-controlled stack base
  • Attacker can manipulate return addresses and local variables
  • Execute arbitrary code in kernel mode

Impact: Arbitrary kernel code execution with full system compromise.


Threat Assessment and Impact

Attack Vector and Prerequisites

Aspect Details
Attack Vector Local (requires execution within unprivileged user-mode thread)
Remote Exploitability No (requires prior code execution on target)
Attack Complexity Low (standard syscall access, no special techniques required)
Privileges Required Low (unprivileged user thread with resource pool assignment)
User Interaction None

Attacker Capabilities and Constraints

Attacker Capabilities:

  • Control size parameter in k_object_alloc_size() and k_thread_stack_alloc() syscalls
  • Trigger kernel object initialization syscalls (k_mutex_init(), k_sem_init(), etc.)
  • Observe or infer heap layout through timing or allocation patterns
  • Corrupt kernel memory via out-of-bounds writes

Attacker Constraints:

  • Must execute within the Zephyr sandbox (user-mode thread)
  • Cannot directly access kernel memory (before exploitation)
  • Limited to syscall interface for initial exploitation
  • Heap layout may vary between builds and runtime states

Security Impact: Integrity, Confidentiality, and Availability

Impact Category Severity Details
Integrity Critical Attacker can corrupt arbitrary kernel memory, modify security policies, disable access controls
Confidentiality Critical Attacker can read kernel memory, extract cryptographic keys, access sensitive data
Availability Critical Attacker can crash the system, disable critical services, or cause denial of service
Privilege Escalation Critical Complete bypass of CONFIG_USERSPACE security boundary
Sandbox Escape Critical User-mode thread can execute arbitrary kernel-mode code

Detection and Identification

Static Code Analysis Approach

Objective: Identify vulnerable code patterns in Zephyr source.

Analysis Steps:

  1. Locate dynamic_object_create() Function:
   grep -n "dynamic_object_create" kernel/userspace/userspace.c
  1. Examine Size Calculation Expressions:
  • Search for obj_size_get(otype) + size
  • Search for STACK_ELEMENT_DATA_SIZE(size) macro usage
  • Check if these expressions are preceded by overflow validation
  1. Verify Overflow Detection:
   // VULNERABLE: No overflow check
   size_t backing_size = obj_size_get(otype) + size;
   // PATCHED: Explicit overflow validation
   if (size > SIZE_MAX - obj_size_get(otype)) {
       return -EOVERFLOW;
   }
   size_t backing_size = obj_size_get(otype) + size;
  1. Check Verification Handlers:
  • Audit z_vrfy_k_object_alloc_size() in kernel/userspace/userspace_handler.c
  • Ensure it validates the size parameter, not just otype
  1. Automated Scanning:
   # Use static analysis tools to detect unchecked arithmetic
   clang --analyze kernel/userspace/userspace.c
   cppcheck --enable=all kernel/userspace/userspace.c

Runtime Monitoring and Heap Integrity Checks

Objective: Detect exploitation attempts at runtime.

Monitoring Strategies:

  1. Syscall Parameter Validation:
  • Log all k_object_alloc_size() and k_thread_stack_alloc() syscalls
  • Flag calls with size parameters approaching SIZE_MAX
  • Alert on repeated allocation failures followed by initialization attempts
  1. Heap Integrity Monitoring:
  • Enable Zephyr’s heap debugging features (CONFIG_HEAP_MEM_POOL_SIZE, CONFIG_SYS_HEAP_RUNTIME_STATS)
  • Monitor for unexpected heap chunk header corruption
  • Detect allocation/deallocation mismatches
  1. Object Initialization Validation:
  • Instrument K_SYSCALL_OBJ_INIT() macro to log object sizes
  • Compare allocated heap size with object initialization size
  • Alert on size mismatches
  1. Example Monitoring Code:
   // In dynamic_object_create() - add validation
   if (backing_size < obj_size_get(otype)) {
       LOG_ERR("Heap allocation smaller than object size!");
       LOG_ERR("  Object type: %d, Object size: %zu, Heap size: %zu",
               otype, obj_size_get(otype), backing_size);
       // Trigger security alert
   }

Identifying Vulnerable Deployments

Assessment Checklist:

  • [ ] Zephyr RTOS version identified and documented
  • [ ] CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled in kernel configuration?
  • [ ] CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS or CONFIG_DYNAMIC_THREAD enabled?
  • [ ] User-mode threads assigned resource pools?
  • [ ] Source code reviewed for overflow validation in dynamic_object_create()?
  • [ ] Runtime heap monitoring enabled?
  • [ ] Syscall logging and auditing in place?

Remediation and Mitigation

Applying the Official Patch

Patch Strategy:

The official fix adds explicit unsigned integer overflow validation to dynamic_object_create():

// PATCHED VERSION
static void *dynamic_object_create(enum k_obj_type otype, size_t size)
{
    size_t obj_size = obj_size_get(otype);
    // OVERFLOW CHECK: Validate size addition
    if (size > SIZE_MAX - obj_size) {
        LOG_ERR("Integer overflow in object allocation");
        return NULL;
    }
    size_t backing_size = obj_size + size;
    // Proceed with allocation
    void *heap_ptr = sys_heap_alloc(&current_pool->heap, backing_size);
    if (!heap_ptr) {
        return NULL;
    }
    // ... rest of initialization ...
    return heap_ptr;
}

Deployment Steps:

  1. Obtain Patch:
  • Download from official Zephyr repository or security advisory
  • Verify patch authenticity and signature
  1. Apply to Source:
   cd zephyr/
   git apply cve-2026-19569.patch
  1. Rebuild Kernel:
   west build -b <board> -t clean
   west build -b <board>
  1. Validate Build:
  • Verify no compilation errors
  • Run unit tests for kernel object allocation
  • Test user-mode thread functionality
  1. Deploy to Devices:
  • Flash patched firmware to all affected devices
  • Verify firmware version post-deployment
  • Monitor for any regressions

Configuration Hardening Workarounds

Temporary Mitigation (Until Patch Applied):

If immediate patching is not possible, disable dynamic object allocation:

# Disable dynamic kernel object allocation
CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS=n
# Disable dynamic thread creation
CONFIG_DYNAMIC_THREAD=n

Trade-offs:

  • ✓ Eliminates vulnerability
  • ✗ Disables dynamic object/thread creation from user-mode
  • ✗ May break applications relying on dynamic allocation

Alternative Hardening:

# Restrict resource pool assignment
CONFIG_USERSPACE_RESOURCE_POOL_SIZE=1024  # Limit pool size
# Enable heap debugging
CONFIG_SYS_HEAP_RUNTIME_STATS=y
CONFIG_HEAP_MEM_POOL_SIZE=8192
# Enable syscall logging
CONFIG_USERSPACE_SYSCALL_LOG=y

Resource Pool Restrictions

Principle: Limit the capabilities of untrusted user-mode threads.

Implementation:

  1. Assign Minimal Resource Pools:
   // Allocate small resource pool for untrusted thread
   K_THREAD_RESOURCE_POOL_DEFINE(untrusted_pool, 512);
   k_thread_create(&untrusted_thread, stack, STACK_SIZE,
                   untrusted_entry, NULL, NULL, NULL,
                   K_PRIO_USER, K_USER | K_INHERIT_PERMS,
                   K_NO_WAIT);
   // Assign restricted pool
   k_thread_resource_pool_assign(&untrusted_thread, &untrusted_pool);
  1. Monitor Pool Exhaustion:
  • Log allocation failures
  • Alert on repeated allocation attempts
  • Terminate threads that exhaust pools
  1. Separate Pools by Trust Level:
   K_THREAD_RESOURCE_POOL_DEFINE(trusted_pool, 4096);
   K_THREAD_RESOURCE_POOL_DEFINE(untrusted_pool, 512);
   // Assign based on thread origin/privilege

Implementation Guidance for Security Teams

Patch Deployment Strategy

Phase 1: Assessment (Week 1)

  • Inventory all Zephyr deployments
  • Identify vulnerable configurations
  • Prioritize critical systems
  • Establish testing environment

Phase 2: Testing (Week 2-3)

  • Apply patch to test devices
  • Run regression test suite
  • Validate user-mode thread functionality
  • Stress-test heap allocation

Phase 3: Staged Deployment (Week 4-6)

  • Deploy to non-critical systems first
  • Monitor for issues
  • Deploy to production systems in batches
  • Maintain rollback capability

Phase 4: Verification (Week 7)

  • Confirm all devices patched
  • Verify firmware versions
  • Audit deployment logs
  • Close remediation tickets

Testing and Validation

Test Cases:

  1. Overflow Detection Test:
   // Verify overflow is caught
   k_obj_handle_t handle = k_object_alloc_size(K_OBJ_MUTEX, SIZE_MAX - 10);
   ASSERT_NULL(handle);  // Should fail
  1. Normal Allocation Test:
   // Verify normal allocations still work
   k_obj_handle_t handle = k_object_alloc_size(K_OBJ_MUTEX, 64);
   ASSERT_NOT_NULL(handle);
   k_mutex_init(handle);
   ASSERT_OK(k_mutex_lock(handle, K_NO_WAIT));
  1. Heap Integrity Test:
   // Verify heap metadata is not corrupted
   void *ptr1 = k_malloc(256);
   k_obj_handle_t handle = k_object_alloc_size(K_OBJ_MUTEX, 64);
   k_mutex_init(handle);
   void *ptr2 = k_malloc(256);
   // Verify ptr1 and ptr2 are valid and uncorrupted
   memset(ptr1, 0xAA, 256);
   memset(ptr2, 0xBB, 256);
   ASSERT_OK(verify_memory_pattern(ptr1, 0xAA, 256));
   ASSERT_OK(verify_memory_pattern(ptr2, 0xBB, 256));
  1. User-Mode Thread Test:
   // Verify user-mode threads still function
   k_thread_create(&user_thread, user_stack, STACK_SIZE,
                   user_entry, NULL, NULL, NULL,
                   K_PRIO_USER, K_USER, K_NO_WAIT);
   k_thread_join(&user_thread, K_FOREVER);

Monitoring Post-Deployment

Metrics to Track:

Metric Target Alert Threshold
Patch Deployment Rate 100% < 95% after 2 weeks
Syscall Failures < 0.1% > 1%
Heap Allocation Failures < 0.01% > 0.1%
User-Mode Thread Crashes 0 > 0
Security Alerts 0 > 0

Monitoring Implementation:

// Log syscall parameters
void z_vrfy_k_object_alloc_size(enum k_obj_type otype, size_t size)
{
    if (size > SIZE_MAX / 2) {
        LOG_WRN("Suspicious allocation: otype=%d, size=%zu", otype, size);
    }
    return z_object_alloc(otype, size);
}
// Monitor heap health
void heap_monitor_task(void)
{
    struct sys_heap_stats stats;
    sys_heap_runtime_stats_get(&pool->heap, &stats);
    if (stats.free_bytes < HEAP_LOW_WATER_MARK) {
        LOG_WRN("Heap pressure: %zu bytes free", stats.free_bytes);
    }
}

Frequently Asked Questions

Q: What causes CVE-2026-19569?

A: The kernel function dynamic_object_create() fails to check for unsigned integer wrap-around when calculating allocation sizes for dynamic objects and thread stacks. An unprivileged user thread can pass a large size parameter that wraps around to a small number, causing the kernel to allocate a truncated heap buffer while registering a full-sized object descriptor.

Q: Which Zephyr configurations are vulnerable?

A: Systems must have CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled along with CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS (or CONFIG_DYNAMIC_THREAD), and the executing thread must have an assigned kernel resource pool. All Zephyr RTOS builds with these configurations lack explicit unsigned wrap-around checks.

Q: Can this vulnerability be exploited remotely?

A: No. CVE-2026-19569 requires local execution within an unprivileged user-mode thread inside the Zephyr sandbox. Remote exploitation is not possible without prior code execution on the target system.

Q: What is the severity classification?

A: CVE-2026-19569 is classified as Critical. It enables privilege escalation from user-mode to kernel-mode, complete memory corruption, and breakdown of the CONFIG_USERSPACE security boundary.

Q: How does the patch fix this issue?

A: The fix explicitly validates all size calculation expressions (obj_size_get(otype) + size and STACK_ELEMENT_DATA_SIZE(size)) for unsigned integer overflow before heap allocation. If overflow is detected, the kernel rejects the request and properly frees any partially initialized descriptors.

Q: What is the attack complexity?

A: Attack complexity is Low. An attacker only needs standard syscall access from user space and knowledge of the vulnerable functions. No special privileges or complex exploitation techniques are required.

Q: Can I disable this vulnerability without patching?

A: Yes, as a temporary workaround, disable CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS and CONFIG_DYNAMIC_THREAD if dynamic kernel object or thread creation from user space is not required. However, applying the official patch is the recommended solution.

Q: How should I prioritize patching this vulnerability?

A: Given the Critical severity and low attack complexity, this vulnerability should be prioritized for immediate patching in all production Zephyr deployments using user-mode support with dynamic object allocation enabled.

Q: Are there any known exploits in the wild?

A: As of the publication date, there are no confirmed public exploits. However, the low attack complexity makes exploitation straightforward for motivated attackers with access to user-mode execution.

Q: Does this affect Zephyr deployments without user-mode support?

A: No. Systems with CONFIG_USERSPACE=n are not vulnerable, as the vulnerable code path is only reachable from user-mode syscalls.


References

  • Zephyr RTOS Project: https://www.zephyrproject.org/
  • Vulnerable Components:
  • kernel/userspace/userspace.c (dynamic_object_create())
  • kernel/userspace/userspace_handler.c (z_vrfy_k_object_alloc_size())
  • include/zephyr/sys/kobject.h (k_object_alloc_size())
  • kernel/dynamic.c (k_thread_stack_alloc())
  • Related Security Features:
  • Zephyr User-Mode Support Documentation
  • Zephyr Memory Management Guide
  • Zephyr Kernel Object Management

Document Version: 1.0
Last Updated: 2026
Classification: Security Advisory
Distribution: Unrestricted

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